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Abstract
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to
predict agents’ behaviour. To better understand the spread of various
products through a social network [2] introduced a threshold model, in
which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of sev-
eral alternatives. To analyze the consequences of such product adoption
we associate here with each such social network a natural strategic game
between the agents.
In these games the payoff of each player weakly increases when more
players choose his strategy, which is exactly opposite to the congestion
games. The possibility of not choosing any product results in two special
types of (pure) Nash equilibria.
We show that such games may have no Nash equilibrium and that
determining an existence of a Nash equilibrium, also of a special type,
is NP-complete. This implies the same result for a more general class
of games, namely polymatrix games. The situation changes when the
underlying graph of the social network is a DAG, a simple cycle, or, more
generally, has no source nodes. For these three classes we determine the
complexity of an existence of (a special type of) Nash equilibria.
We also clarify for these categories of games the status and the com-
plexity of the finite best response property (FBRP) and the finite im-
provement property (FIP). Further, we introduce a new property of the
uniform FIP which is satisfied when the underlying graph is a simple cy-
cle, but determining it is co-NP-hard in the general case and also when
the underlying graph has no source nodes. The latter complexity results
also hold for the property of being a weakly acyclic game. A preliminary
version of this paper appeared as [19].
Keywords: Social networks, strategic games, Nash equilibrium, finite im-
provement property, complexity.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Social networks are a thriving interdisciplinary research area with links to so-
ciology, economics, epidemiology, computer science, and mathematics. A flurry
of numerous articles and recent books, see, e.g., [8], testifies to the relevance of
this field. It deals with such diverse topics as epidemics, analysis of the connec-
tivity, spread of certain patterns of social behaviour, effects of advertising, and
emergence of ‘bubbles’ in financial markets.
One of the prevalent types of models of social networks are the threshold
models introduced in [9] and [18]. In such a setup each node i has a threshold
θ(i) ∈ (0, 1] and adopts an ‘item’ given in advance (which can be a disease,
trend, or a specific product) when the total weight of incoming edges from the
nodes that have already adopted this item exceeds the threshold. One of the
most important issues studied in the threshold models has been that of the
spread of an item, see, e.g., [17, 14, 7]. From now on we shall refer to an ‘item’
that is spread by a more specific name of a ‘product’.
In this context very few papers dealt with more than one product. One of
them is [11] with its focus on the notions of compatibility and bilinguality that
result when one adopts both available products at an extra cost. Another one
is [5], where the authors investigate whether the algorithmic approach of [14]
can be extended to the case of two products.
In [2] we introduced a new threshold model of a social network in which nodes
(agents) influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of several products.
This model allowed us to study various aspects of the spread of a given product
through a social network, in the presence of other products. We analysed from
the complexity point of view the problems of determining whether adoption of
a given product by the whole network is possible (respectively, necessary), and
when a unique outcome of the adoption process is guaranteed. We also clarified
for social networks without unique outcomes the complexity of determining
whether a given node has to adopt some (respectively, a given) product in
some (respectively, all) final network(s), and the complexity of computing the
minimum and the maximum possible spread of a given product.
1.2 Motivation
We are interested in understanding and predicting the behaviour of the con-
sumers (agents) who form a social network and are confronted with several
alternatives (products). To carry out such an analysis we use the above model
of [2] and associate with each such social network a natural strategic game. In
this game the strategies of an agent are products he can choose. Additionally a
‘null’ strategy is available that models the decision of not choosing any product.
The idea is that after each agent chose a product, or decided not to choose any,
the agents assess the optimality of their choices comparing them to the choices
made by their neighbours. This leads to a natural study of (pure) Nash equilib-
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ria, in particular of those in which some, respectively all, constituent strategies
are non-null.
Social network games are related to graphical games of [13], in which the
payoff function of each player depends only on a (usually small) number of other
players. In this work the focus was mainly on finding mixed (approximate)
Nash equilibria. However, in graphical games the underlying structures are
undirected graphs. Also, social network games exhibit the following join the
crowd property:
the payoff of each player weakly increases when more players choose
his strategy.
(We define this property more precisely in Subsection 2.3.)
Since these games are related to social networks, some natural special cases
are of interest: when the underlying graph is a DAG or has no source nodes,
with the special case of a simple cycle. Such social networks correspond respec-
tively to a hierarchical organization or to a ‘circle of friends’, in which everybody
has a friend (a neighbour). Studying Nash equilibria of these games and vari-
ous properties defined in terms of improvement paths allows us to gain better
insights into the consequences of adopting products.
1.3 Related work
There are a number of papers that focus on games associated with various forms
of networks, see, e.g., [20] for an overview. A more recent example is [1] that
analyses a strategic game between players being firms who select nodes in an
undirected graph in order to advertise competing products via ‘viral marketing’.
However, in spite of the focus on similar questions concerning the existence and
structure of Nash equilibria and on their reachability, from a technical point
of view, the games studied here seem to be unrelated to the games studied
elsewhere.
Still, it is useful to mention the following phenomenon. When the underlying
graph of a social network has no source nodes, the game always has a trivial Nash
equilibrium in which no agent chooses a product. A similar phenomenon has
been recently observed in [6] in the case of their network formation games, where
such equilibria are called degenerate. Further, note that the ‘join the crowd’
property is exactly the opposite of the defining property of the congestion games
with player-specific payoff functions introduced in [15]. In these game the payoff
of each player weakly decreases when more players choose his strategy. Because
in our case (in contrast to [15]) the players can have different strategy sets, the
resulting games are not coordination games.
1.4 Plan of the paper and summary of the results
In the next section we recall the model of social networks introduced in [2] and
define strategic games associated with these networks. Next, in Section 3 we
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show that in general Nash equilibria do not need to exist even if we limit our-
selves to a special class of networks in which for each node all its neighbours have
the same weight. We prove that determining an existence of a Nash equilibrium
is NP-complete, also when we limit our attention to the two special types of
equilibria. Then in Section 4 we show that this NP-completeness result holds
for a more general class of games, namely polymatrix games.
Motivated by these results we consider in Section 5 strategic games associ-
ated with three classes of social networks, the ones whose underlying graph is a
DAG, a simple cycle, or, more generally, has no source nodes. For each class we
determine the complexity of deciding whether a Nash equilibrium (possibly of
a special type) exists. We also show that for these games the price of anarchy
and the price of stability are unbounded.
Next, in Section 6 we study the finite best response property (FBRP) of
[16]. We prove that deciding whether a game associated with a social network
has the FBRP is co-NP-hard. Then, in Section 7, we consider the above three
classes of games. We show that when the underlying graph is a DAG or there
are just two nodes, the game has the FBRP, that there is an efficient algorithm
when the underlying graph is a simple cycle, and that the problem is co-NP-
hard when the underlying graph has no source nodes. In Sections 8 and 9 we
obtain analogous results for the finite improvement property (FIP), though the
complexity when the underlying graph is a simple cycle remains open.
In Section 10 we introduce a new property, that we call the uniform FIP, that
is of independent interest. We show that deciding whether a game associated
with a social network has the uniform FIP is co-NP-hard. Then, we study
in Section 11 the special cases. We show that when the underlying graph is a
simple cycle the game has the uniform FIP. However, when the underlying graph
has no source nodes the problem is co-NP-hard. In Section 12 we show that
the property of having the uniform FIP is stronger than that of being weakly
acyclic (see [21] and [15]). Determining whether a game is weakly acyclic is also
co-NP-hard, also when the underlying graph has no source nodes
Finally, in Section 13 we summarize the obtained complexity results and
suggest some further research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Strategic games
Assume a set {1, . . . , n} of players, where n > 1. A strategic game for n
players, written as (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn), consists of a non-empty set Si of
strategies and a payoff function pi : S1 × . . .× Sn → R, for each player i.
Fix a strategic game G := (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). We denote S1 × · · · × Sn
by S, call each element s ∈ S a joint strategy, denote the ith element of s by
si, and abbreviate the sequence (sj)j 6=i to s−i. Occasionally we write (si, s−i)
instead of s.
We call a strategy si of player i a best response to a joint strategy s−i of
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his opponents if ∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i). We call a joint strategy s a
Nash equilibrium if each si is a best response to s−i, that is, if
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∀s′i ∈ Si pi(si, s−i) ≥ pi(s
′
i, s−i).
Further, we call a strategy s′i of player i a better response given a joint strategy
s if pi(s′i, s−i) > pi(si, s−i).
Given a joint strategy s we call the sum SW (s) =
∑n
j=1 pj(s) the social
welfare of s. When the social welfare of s is maximal we call s a social
optimum. Recall that, given a finite game that has a Nash equilibrium, its
price of anarchy (respectively, price of stability) is the ratio SW (s)
SW (s′) where
s is a social optimum and s′ is a Nash equilibrium with the lowest (respectively,
highest) social welfare. In the case of division by zero, we interpret the outcome
as ∞.
Following the terminology of [16], a path in S is a sequence (s1, s2, . . .) of
joint strategies such that for every k > 1 there is a player i such that sk =
(s′i, s
k−1
−i ) for some s
′
i 6= s
k−1
i . A path is called an improvement path if it
is maximal and for all k > 1, pi(sk) > pi(sk−1) where i is the player who
deviated from sk−1. If an improvement path satisfies the additional property
that ski is a best response to s
k−1
−i for all k > 1 then it is called a best response
improvement path.
The last condition simply means that each deviating player selects a better
(best) response. A game has the finite improvement property (FIP), (re-
spectively, the finite best response property (FBRP)) if every improvement
path (respectively, every best response improvement path) is finite. Obviously,
if a game has the FIP or the FBRP, then it has a Nash equilibrium — it is
the last element of each path. Finally, a game is called weakly acyclic (see
[21, 15]) if for every joint strategy there exists a finite improvement path that
starts at it.
2.2 Social networks
We are interested in specific strategic games defined over social networks. In
what follows we focus on a model of the social networks recently introduced in
[2].
Let V = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents and G = (V,E,w) a weighted
directed graph with wij ∈ [0, 1] being the weight of the edge (i, j). We assume
that G does not have self loops, i.e., for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (i, i) 6∈ E. We often
use the notation i → j to denote (i, j) ∈ E and write i →∗ j if there is a path
from i to j in the graph G. Given a node i of G we denote by N(i) the set
of nodes from which there is an incoming edge to i. We call each j ∈ N(i) a
neighbour of i in G. We assume that for each node i such that N(i) 6= ∅,∑
j∈N(i) wji ≤ 1. An agent i ∈ V is said to be a source node in G if N(i) = ∅.
Let P be a finite set of alternatives or products. By a social network (from
now on, just network) we mean a tuple S = (G,P , P, θ), where P assigns to
each agent i a non-empty set of products P (i) from which it can make a choice.
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θ is a threshold function that for each i ∈ V and t ∈ P (i) yields a value
θ(i, t) ∈ (0, 1].
Given a network S we denote by source(S) the set of source nodes in the
underlying graph G. One of the classes of the networks we shall study are the
ones with source(S) = ∅. We call a network equitable if the weights are defined
as wji = 1|N(i)| for all nodes i and j ∈ N(i).
2.3 Social network games
Fix a network S = (G,P , P, θ). Each agent can adopt a product from his
product set or choose not to adopt any product. We denote the latter choice by
t0.
With each network S we associate a strategic game G(S). The idea is that
the nodes simultaneously choose a product or abstain from choosing any. Sub-
sequently each node assesses his choice by comparing it with the choices made
by his neighbours. Formally, we define the game as follows:
• the players are the agents,
• the set of strategies for player i is Si := P (i) ∪ {t0},
• for i ∈ V , t ∈ P (i) and a joint strategy s, let N ti (s) := {j ∈ N(i) | sj = t},
i.e., N ti (s) is the set of neighbours of i who adopted the product t in s.
The payoff function is defined as follows, where c0 is some positive constant
given in advance:
– for i ∈ source(S),
pi(s) :=
{
0 if si = t0
c0 if si ∈ P (i)
– for i 6∈ source(S),
pi(s) :=


0 if si = t0
(
∑
j∈N t
i
(s)
wji)− θ(i, t) if si = t, for some t ∈ P (i)
Let us explain the underlying motivations behind the above definition. In
the first item we assume that the payoff function for the source nodes is constant
only for simplicity. In the last section of the paper we explain that the obtained
results hold equally well in the case when the source nodes have arbitrary posi-
tive utility for each product.
The second item in the payoff definition is motivated by the following con-
siderations. When agent i is not a source node, his ‘satisfaction’ from a joint
strategy depends positively on the accumulated weight (read: ‘influence’) of
his neighbours who made the same choice as he did, and negatively from his
threshold level (read: ‘resistance’) to adopt this product. The assumption that
θ(i, t) > 0 reflects the view that there is always some resistance to adopt a prod-
uct. So when this resistance is high, it can happen that the payoff is negative.
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Of course, in such a situation not adopting any product, represented by the
strategy t0, is a better alternative.
The presence of this possibility allows each agent to refrain from choosing a
product. This refers to natural situations, such as deciding not to purchase a
smartphone or not going on vacation. In the last section we refer to an initiated
research on social network games in which the strategy t0 is not present. Such
games capture situations in which the agents have to take some decision, for
instance selecting a secondary school for their children.
By definition the payoff of each player depends only on the strategies chosen
by his neighbours, so social network games are related to graphical games of
[13]. However, the underlying dependence structure of a social network game is a
directed graph and the presence of the special strategy t0 available to each player
makes these games more specific. Also, as already mentioned in Subsection 1.2,
these games satisfy the join the crowd property that we define as follows:
Each payoff function pi depends only on the strategy chosen by
player i and the set of players who also chose his strategy. Moreover,
the dependence on this set is monotonic.
In what follows for t ∈ P ∪ {t0} we use the notation t to denote the joint
strategy s where sj = t for all j ∈ V . This notation is legal only if for all agents
i it holds that t ∈ P (i).
The presence of the strategy t0 motivates the introduction and study of
special types of Nash equilibria. We say that a Nash equilibrium s is
• determined if for all i, si 6= t0,
• non-trivial if for some i, si 6= t0,
• trivial if for all i, si = t0, i.e., s = t0.
3 Nash equilibria: general case
The first natural question that we address is that of the existence of Nash
equilibria in social network games. We establish the following result.
Theorem 1. Deciding whether for a network S the game G(S) has a (respec-
tively, non-trivial) Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
To prove it we first construct an example of a social network game with no
Nash equilibrium and then use it to determine the complexity of the existence
of Nash equilibria.
Example 2. Consider the network given in Figure 1, where the product set of
each agent is marked next to the node denoting it and the weights are labels
on the edges. The source nodes are represented by the unique product in the
product set.
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Figure 1: A network with no Nash equilibrium
So the weights on the edges from the nodes {t1}, {t2}, {t3} are marked by
w1 and the weights on the edges forming the triangle are marked by w2. We
assume that each threshold is a constant θ, where θ < w1 < w2. So it is more
profitable to a player residing on the triangle to adopt the product adopted by
his neighbour residing on a triangle than by the other neighbour who is a source
node. For convenience we represent each joint strategy as a triple of strategies
of players 1, 2 and 3.
It is easy to check that in the game associated with this network no joint
strategy is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, each agent residing on the triangle can
secure a payoff of at least w1−θ > 0, so it suffices to analyze the joint strategies
in which t0 is not used. There are in total eight such joint strategies. Here is
their listing, where in each joint strategy we underline the strategy that is not
a best response to the choice of other players: (t1, t1, t2), (t1, t1, t3), (t1, t3, t2),
(t1, t3, t3), (t2, t1, t2), (t2, t1, t3), (t2, t3, t2), (t2, t3, t3). ✷
Proof of Theorem 1.
As in [2] we use a reduction from the NP-complete PARTITION problem,
which is: given n positive rational numbers (a1, . . ., an), is there a set S such that∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai? Consider an instance I of PARTITION. Without loss of
generality, suppose we have normalised the numbers so that
∑n
i=1 ai = 1. Then
the problem instance sounds: Is there a set S such that
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai =
1
2?
To construct the appropriate network we employ the networks given in Fig-
ure 1 and in Figure 2, where for each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we set wia = wib = ai,
and assume that the threshold of the nodes a and b is constant and equals 12 .
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Figure 2: A network related to the PARTITION problem
We use two copies of the network given in Figure 1, one unchanged and
the other in which the product t1 is replaced by t′1, and construct the desired
network S by identifying the node a of the network from Figure 2 with the node
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marked by {t1} in the network from Figure 1, and the node b with the node
marked by {t′1} in the modified version of the network from Figure 1.
Suppose now that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem exists, that is, for some set S ⊆ {1, . . ., n} we have
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai =
1
2 . Consider the game G(S). Take the joint strategy formed by the following
strategies:
• t1 assigned to each node i ∈ S in the network from Figure 2,
• t′1 assigned to each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ S in the network from Figure 2,
• t0 assigned to the nodes a, b and the nodes 1 in both versions of the
network from Figure 1,
• t3 assigned to the nodes 2, 3 in both versions of the networks from Figure 1
and the two nodes marked by {t3},
• t2 assigned to the nodes marked by {t2}.
We claim that this joint strategy is a non-trivial Nash equilibrium. Consider
first the player (i.e, node) a. The accumulated weight of its neighbours who
chose strategy t1 is 12 , so its payoff after switching to the strategy t1 is 0.
Therefore t0 is indeed a best response for player a. For the same reason, t0 is also
a best response for player b. The analysis for the other nodes is straightforward
and left to the reader.
Conversely, suppose that a joint strategy s is a Nash equilibrium in the game
G(S). Then it is also a non-trivial Nash equilibrium since for each source node
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, si 6= t0. We claim that the strategy selected by the node a in s
is t0. Otherwise, this strategy equals t1 and the strategies selected by the nodes
of the network of Figure 1 form a Nash equilibrium in the game associated
with this network. This yields a contradiction with our previous analysis of this
network.
So t0 is a best response of the node a to the strategies of the other players
chosen in s. This means that
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia ≤
1
2 . By the same reasoning
t0 is a best response of the node b to the strategies of the other players chosen
in s. This means that
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t′1
wib ≤
1
2 .
But
∑n
i=1 ai = 1 and for i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, wia = wib = ai, and si ∈ {t1, t
′
1}
since i is a source node. So both above inequalities are in fact equalities. Conse-
quently for S := {i ∈ {1, . . ., n} | si = t1} we have
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai. In other
words, there exists a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem.
Finally, given an instance of the PARTITION problem, the above network
S can be constructed from it in polynomial time. This proves the NP-hardness
of the considered problem.
To prove that the problem lies in NP it suffices to notice that given a network
S = (G,P , P, θ) with n nodes checking whether a joint strategy is a non-trivial
Nash equilibrium can be done by means of n · |P| checks, so in polynomial
time.
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Focussing on determined Nash equilibria does not change the matters.
Theorem 3. Deciding whether for a network S the game G(S) has a determined
Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
Proof. We use an instance of the PARTITION problem in the form of n posi-
tive rational numbers (a1, . . ., an), normalised as in the previous proof, and the
network given in Figure 2.
Suppose now that a solution to the considered instance of the partition
problem exists, that is for some set S ⊆ {1, . . ., n} we have
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai =
1
2 . Take the joint strategy s formed by the following strategies:
• t1 assigned to each node i ∈ S and the node a,
• t′1 assigned to each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ S and the node b.
Then pa(t1, s−i) = 12 − θ(a, t1) = 0, so pa(t1, s−i) ≥ pa(t0, s−i). Analogously
pb(t′1, s−i) ≥ pb(t0, s−i). So s is a determined Nash equlibrium in the strategic
game associated with the above network.
Consider now a determined Nash equilibrium s in this game. Then sa = t1
and pa(t1, s−i) ≥ pa(t0, s−i) = 0. So for S := {i ∈ {1, . . ., n} | si = t1} we
have
∑
i∈S ai ≥
1
2 . Analogously
∑
i6∈S ai ≥
1
2 . Since
∑n
i=1 ai = 1, in both cases
we have in fact equalities and hence there exists a solution to the considered
instance of the PARTITION problem.
Recall that the social network in Example 2 used three products. The fol-
lowing result shows that to construct a social network S such that G(S) has no
Nash equilibrium in fact at least three products are required.
Theorem 4. For a network S, if there exists a non-empty set X ⊆ P such
that |X | ≤ 2 and for all i ∈ source(S), P (i) ∩ X 6= ∅ then G(S) has a Nash
equilibrium and it can be computed in polynomial time.
In particular G(S) has a Nash equilibrium when all nodes i have the same
set of two products.
Proof. Given an initial joint strategy we call a maximal sequence of best re-
sponse deviations to a given strategy t (in an arbitrary order) a t-phase. Let
S = (G,P , P, θ) where G = (V,E,w).
First, suppose that |X | = 1, say X = {t1}. Let s be the resulting joint
strategy after performing a t1-phase starting in the joint strategy t0. We show
that s is a Nash equilibrium. First note that sj = t1 for every j ∈ source(S).
Further, in the t1-phase, if a joint strategy s2 is obtained from s1 by having some
nodes switch to product t1 and t1 is a best response for a node i to s1−i, then
t1 remains a best response for i to s2−i. Indeed, by the join the crowd property
pi(t1, s2−i) ≥ pi(t1, s
1
−i) and pi(t1, s
1
−i) ≥ pi(t0, s
1
−i), so pi(t1, s
2
−i) ≥ pi(t0, s
2
−i).
Consequently after the first t1-phase, in the resulting joint strategy s, each node
that has the strategy t1 plays a best response. If for some j, sj = t0 then by
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the definition of the t1-phase, j is playing his best response as well. Therefore
s is a Nash equilibrium.
Now suppose that |X | = 2, say X = {t1, t2}. Let Vt1 = {j ∈ source(S) | t1 ∈
P (j)} and V t1 = {j ∈ source(S) | t1 6∈ P (j)}. Let S
t1 = (Gt1 ,P , P, θ), where
Gt1 is the induced subgraph of G on the nodes V \V t1 . Let s
t1 be the resulting
joint strategy in St1 after performing a t1-phase starting in t0. By the previous
argument, st1 is a Nash equilibrium in G(St1). Now consider the joint strategy
s in G(S) defined as follows:
si =
{
t0 if i ∈ V t1
st1i otherwise
Starting at s, we repeatedly perform a t2-phase followed by a t0-phase. We
claim that this process terminates in a Nash equilibrium in G(S).
First note that if a joint strategy s2 is obtained from s1 by having some
nodes switch to product t2 and t2 is a best response for a node i to s1−i, then
t2 remains a best response for i to s2−i. The argument is analogous to the one
in the previous case. Therefore after the first t2-phase each node that has the
strategy t2 plays a best response. Call the outcome of the first t2-phase s′′.
Now consider a node i that deviated to t0 starting at s′′ by means of a
best response. By the observation just made, node i deviated from product
t1. So, again by the join the crowd property, this deviation does not affect the
property that the nodes that selected t2 in s′′ play a best response. Iterating
this reasoning we conclude that after the first t0-phase each node that has the
strategy t2 continues to play a best response.
By the same reasoning subsequent t2 and t0-phases have the same effect on
the set of nodes that have the strategy t2, namely that each of these nodes
continues to play a best response.
Moreover, this set continues to weakly increase. Consequently these repeated
applications of the t2-phase followed by the t0-phase terminate, say in a joint
strategy s′. Now suppose that a node i does not play a best response to s′−i.
Then clearly i 6∈ source(S). If s′i = t0, then by the construction t2 is not a best
response, so t1 is a best response.
Suppose si = t0. Consider the joint strategy st1 which is a Nash equilibrium
in G(St1 ). We have pi(t1, s
t1
−i) ≤ pi(t0, s
t1
−i). Since i 6∈ source(S), we have
si = s
t1
i . Since for all j ∈ V t1 , t1 6∈ P (j) we have pi(t1, s−i) ≤ pi(t0, s−i) as
well. By the join the crowd property pi(t1, s′−i) ≤ pi(t1, s−i), so pi(t1, s
′
−i) ≤
pi(t0, s′−i), which yields a contradiction. Hence node i deviated to t0 from some
intermediate joint strategy s1 by selecting a best response. So pi(t1, s1−i) ≤
pi(t0, s1−i). Moreover, by the join the crowd property pi(t1, s
′
−i) ≤ pi(t1, s
1
−i),
so pi(t1, s′−i) ≤ pi(t0, s
′
−i), which yields a contradiction, as well.
Further, by the construction s′i 6= t2, so the only alternative is that s
′
i = t1.
But then either t0 or t2 is a best response, which contradicts the construction
of s′. We conclude that s′ is a Nash equilibrium in G(S).
Finally, note that each t-phase takes at most n steps to terminate, where n is
the number of nodes in G. Since in each repeated iteration of a t2-phase followed
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by a t0-phase, the set of nodes which chose t2 is weakly increasing, this process
terminates after at most O(n) iterations. Therefore this Nash equilibrium can
be computed in polynomial time.
4 Polymatrix games
We now apply the results of the previous section to a class of games that are
more general than social network games.
A polymatrix game, see [12, 10], is a finite strategic game in which the influ-
ence of a pure strategy selected by any player on the payoff of any other player is
always the same, regardless what strategies other players select. Formally, it is a
game (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn) in which for all pairs of players i and j there exists
a partial payoff function aij such that for any joint strategy s = (s1, . . . , sn),
the payoff of player i is given by pi(s) :=
∑
j 6=i a
ij(si, sj).
Theorem 5. Deciding whether a polymatrix game has a Nash equilibrium is
NP-complete.
Proof. It is clear that the problem is in NP since one can guess a joint strategy
and check whether it is a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time. To prove the
hardness result we show that social network games are a subclass of polymatrix
games. The claim then follows from Theorem 1.
For a social network S = (G,P , P, θ) with n agents, let the associated game
be G(S) = (S1, . . . , Sn, p1, . . . , pn). We translate G(S) into a payoff equivalent
polymatrix game G′ = (S1, . . . , Sn, p′1, . . . , p
′
n) as follows. For a joint strategy s
and players i and j, the partial payoff functions are given by
• for i ∈ source(S),
aij(si, sj) :=
{
0 if si = t0,
c0
n−1 if si ∈ P (i),
• for i 6∈ source(S),
aij(si, sj) :=


0 if si = t0,
wji −
θ(i,si)
n−1 if j ∈ N(i), si 6= t0 and si = sj ,
− θ(i,si)
n−1 otherwise.
The payoff function for player i is then defined as p′i(s) =
∑
j 6=i a
ij(si, sj). To
complete the proof, we show that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all joint strategies
s, we have p′i(s) = pi(s). Recall that for a player i and a joint strategy s,
N sii (s) = {j ∈ N(i) | si = sj}. We have the following cases:
• si = t0. Then p′i(s) = 0 = pi(s).
• si 6= t0 and i ∈ source(S).
Then p′i(s) =
∑
j 6=i
c0
n−1 = (n− 1) ·
c0
n−1 = pi(s).
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• si 6= t0 and i 6∈ source(S).
Then p′i(s) =
∑
j∈N
si
i
(s)(wji −
θ(i,si)
n−1 ) +
∑
j 6=i,j 6∈N
si
i
(s) −
θ(i,si)
n−1
=
∑
j∈N
si
i
(s) wji − (n− 1) ·
θ(i,si)
n−1
= pi(s).
5 Nash equilibria: special cases
In view of the fact that in general Nash equilibria may not exist we now consider
networks with special properties of the underlying directed graph. We focus on
three natural classes.
5.1 Directed acyclic graphs
We consider first networks whose underlying graph is a directed acyclic graph
(DAG). Intuitively, such networks correspond to hierarchical organizations. This
restriction leads to a different outcome in the analysis of Nash equilibria.
Given a DAG G := (V,E), we use a fixed level by level enumeration rank()
of its nodes so that for all i, j ∈ V
if rank(i) < rank(j), then there is no path in G from j to i. (1)
Theorem 6. Consider a network S whose underlying graph is a DAG.
(i) G(S) always has a non-trivial Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Deciding whether G(S) has a determined Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
Proof.
(i) We proceed by assigning to each node a strategy following the order deter-
mined by (1). Given a node we assign to it a best response to the sequence of
strategies already assigned to all his neighbours. (By definition the strategies
of other players have no influence on the choice of a best response.) This yields
a non-trivial Nash equilibrium. This result is also an immediate consequence of
Theorem 23 proved in Section 8.
(ii) The claim follows from Theorem 3 since the underlying graph of the network
from Figure 2 used in its proof is a DAG.
Note that when the underlying graph is a DAG all Nash equilibria are non-
trivial. Further, in the procedure described in (i), in general more than one best
response can exist. In that case multiple Nash equilibria exist.
The above procedure uses the set of best responses BRi(sN(i)) of player i to
the joint strategy sN(i) of his neighbours in G(S). This set is defined directly in
terms of sN(i) and S as follows, where S = (G,P , P, θ).
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Let
Z>0i (sN(i)) := {t ∈ P (i) |
∑
k∈N(i),sk=t
wki − θ(i, t) > 0},
Z=0i (sN(i)) := {t0} ∪ {t ∈ P (i) |
∑
k∈N(i),sk=t
wki − θ(i, t) = 0}.
Then
BRi(sN(i)) :=


argmax
t∈Z>0
i
(sN(i))
( ∑
k∈N(i),sk=t
wki − θ(i, t)
)
if Z>0i (sN(i)) 6= ∅
Z=0i (sN(i)) otherwise
Finally, we consider the price of anarchy and the price of stability for the
considered class of games. The following simple result holds.
Theorem 7. The price of anarchy and the price of stability for the games
associated with the networks whose underlying graph is a DAG is unbounded.
Proof. Consider the network depicted in Figure 3.
i
wij //_________{t1} j
wjk //_________{t2} k
{t2}
Figure 3: A network with a high price of anarchy and stability
Choose an arbitrary value r > 0. Suppose first that there exists weights and
thresholds such that wjk − (θ(j, t2) + θ(k, t2)) > rc0. (Recall that the payoff of
player i is c0.)
The game associated with this network has a unique Nash equilibrium,
namely the joint strategy (t1, t0, t0) assigned to the sequence (i, j, k) of nodes.
Its social welfare is c0. In contrast, the social optimum is achieved by the joint
strategy (t1, t2, t2) and equals
c0 + wjk − (θ(j, t2) + θ(k, t2)) > rc0.
So for every value r > 0 there is a network whose game has price of anarchy
and price of stability higher than r.
Suppose now that the inequality wjk − (θ(j, t2) + θ(k, t2)) > rc0 does not
hold for any choice of weights and thresholds. (This is for instance the case
when rc0 ≥ 1, which can be the case as c0 and r are arbitrary.) In that case,
we modify the above social network as follows. First, we replace the node k by
⌈rc0 + 1⌉ nodes, all direct descendants of node j and each with the product set
{t2}. Then we choose the weights and the thresholds in such a way that the
sum of all these weights minus the sum of all the thresholds for the product t2
exceeds rc0. In the resulting game, by the same argument as above, both the
price of anarchy and price of stability are higher than r.
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5.2 Simple cycles
Next, we consider networks whose underlying graph is a simple cycle. To fix
the notation suppose that the underlying graph is 1 → 2 → . . . → n → 1. We
assume that the counting is done in cyclic order within {1, . . . , n} using the
increment operation i ⊕ 1 and the decrement operation i ⊖ 1. In particular,
n⊕ 1 = 1 and 1⊖ 1 = n. The payoff functions can then be rewritten as follows:
pi(s) :=


0 if si = t0
wi⊖1 i − θ(i, si) if si = si⊖1 and si ∈ P (i)
−θ(i, si) otherwise
Clearly t0 is a trivial Nash equilibrium. The following observation clarifies
when other Nash equilibria exist.
Theorem 8. Consider a network S whose underlying graph is a simple cycle.
Then s is a non-trivial (respectively, determined) Nash equilibrium of the game
G(S) iff s is of the form t¯ for some product t and for all i, pi(s) ≥ 0.
Proof. (⇒ ) Consider a non-trival Nash equilibrium s. Suppose that si = t for a
product t. We have pi(s) ≥ pi(t0, s−i) = 0, so si⊖1 = t. Iterating this reasoning
we conclude that s = t¯.
(⇐ ) Straightforward.
This yields a straightforward algorithm that allows us to check whether there
exists a non-trivial, respectively, determined, Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 9. Consider a network S = (G,P , P, θ) whose underlying graph is a
simple cycle. There is a procedure that runs in time O(|P| · n), where n is the
number of nodes in G, that decides whether G(S) has a non-trivial (respectively,
determined) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Thanks to Theorem 8 we can use the following procedure.
VerifyNashCycle(S)
X := P (1);
found := false;
while X 6= ∅ and not found do
choose t ∈ X ; X := X \ {t};
i := 1;
found := (wi⊖1 i ≥ θ(i, t));
while i 6= n and found do
i := i+ 1;
found := (t ∈ P (i)) ∧ (wi⊖1 i ≥ θ(i, t))
od
od
return found
This procedure returns true if a non-trivial (or equivalently, a determined)
Nash equilibrium exists and false otherwise. Its running time is O(|P| · n).
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Next, we consider the price of anarchy and the price of stability. We have
the following counterpart of Theorem 7.
Theorem 10. The price of anarchy and the price of stability for the games
associated with the networks whose underlying graph is a simple cycle is un-
bounded.
Proof. Choose an arbitrary value r > 0 and let ǫ be such that ǫ < min(14 ,
1
2(r+1)).
Then both 1− 2ǫ > 2ǫ and 1−2ǫ2ǫ > r.
Consider the network depicted in Figure 4.
1
)){t1,t2}
2ii
{t1,t2}
Figure 4: Another network with a high price of anarchy and stability
We assume that
w12 − θ(2, t2) = 1− ǫ, w21 − θ(1, t2) = −ǫ, w12 − θ(2, t1) = ǫ, w21 − θ(1, t1) = ǫ.
Then the social optimum is achieved in the joint strategy (t2, t2) and equals
1 − 2ǫ. There are two Nash equilibria, (t1, t1) and the trivial one, with the
respective social welfare 2ǫ and 0.
In the case of the price of anarchy we deal with the division by zero. We
interpret the outcome as∞. The price of stability equals 1−2ǫ2ǫ , so is higher than
r.
5.3 Graphs with no source nodes
Finally, we consider the case when the underlying graphG = (V,E) of a network
S has no source nodes, i.e., for all i ∈ V , N(i) 6= ∅. Intuitively, such a network
corresponds to a ‘circle of friends’: everybody has a friend (a neighbour). For
such networks we prove the following result.
Theorem 11. Consider a network S = (G,P , P, θ) whose underlying graph has
no source nodes. There is a procedure that runs in time O(|P| · n3), where n
is the number of nodes in G, that decides whether G(S) has a non-trivial Nash
equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 11 requires some characterization results that are
of independent interest. The following concept plays a crucial role. Here and
elsewhere we only consider subgraphs that are induced and identify each such
subgraph with its set of nodes. (Recall that (V ′, E′) is an induced subgraph of
(V,E) if V ′ ⊆ V and E′ = E ∩ (V ′ × V ′).)
We say that a (non-empty) strongly connected subgraph (in short, SCS) Ct
of G is self-sustaining for a product t if for all i ∈ Ct,
• t ∈ P (i),
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•
∑
j∈N(i)∩Ct
wji ≥ θ(i, t).
An easy observation is that if S is a network with no source nodes, then it
always has a trivial Nash equilibrium, t0. The following lemma states that for
such networks every non-trivial Nash equilibrium satisfies a structural property
which relates it to the set of self- sustaining SCSs in the underlying graph. We
use the following notation: for a joint strategy s and a product t, At(s) := {i ∈
V | si = t} and P (s) := {t | ∃i ∈ V with si = t}.
Lemma 12. Let S = (G,P , P, θ) be a network whose underlying graph has no
source nodes. If s 6= t0 is a Nash equilibrium in G(S), then for all products
t ∈ P (s) \ {t0} and i ∈ At(s) there exists a self-sustaining SCS Ct ⊆ At(s) for
t and a j ∈ Ct such that j →∗ i.
Proof. Suppose s 6= t0 is a Nash equilibrium. Take any product t 6= t0 and
an agent i such that si = t (by assumption, at least one such t and i exists).
Recall that N ti (s) is the set of neighbours of i who adopted the product t in s.
Consider the set of nodes Pred :=
⋃
m∈N Predm, where
• Pred0 := {i},
• Predm+1 := Predm ∪
⋃
j∈Predm
N tj (s).
By construction for all j ∈ Pred, sj = t and N tj (s)⊆ Pred. Moreover, since
s is a Nash equilibrium, we also have
∑
k∈N t
j
(s)
wkj ≥ θ(j, t).
Consider the partial ordering < between the strongly connected components
of the graph induced by Pred defined by: C < C′ iff j → k for some j ∈ C and
k ∈ C′. Now take some SCS Ct induced by a strongly connected component
that is minimal in the < ordering. Then for all k ∈ Ct we have N tk(s)⊆ Ct and
hence N tk(s)⊆N(k) ∩Ct. This shows that Ct is self-sustaining.
Moreover, by the construction of Pred for all j ∈ Pred, and a fortiori for all
j ∈ Ct, we also have j →∗ i. Since the choice of t and i was arbitrary, the claim
follows.
The converse of Lemma 12 does not hold. Indeed, consider the equitable
network given in Figure 5. The product set of each agent is marked next to
the node denoting the agent. Assume that the threshold of each node is a
constant smaller than 1
k
, where k is the number of incoming edges. So each
agent has a non-negative payoff when he adopts any product adopted by some
of his neighbours. Consider the joint strategy s in which agents 1, 2 and 3 adopt
product t1 and agents 4, 5 and 6 adopt product t3, i.e. , s = (t1, t1, t1, t3, t3, t3).
It follows from the definition that s satisfies the following condition of Lemma 12:
• for all products t ∈ P (s)\ {t0} and k ∈ At(s) there exists a self-sustaining
SCS Ct ⊆ At(s) for t and j ∈ St such that j →∗ k.
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Figure 5: An equitable network
However, s is not a Nash equilibrium since agent 3 has the incentive to
deviate to product t3. Also, note that the joint strategy s′ = (t0, t0, t3, t3, t3, t3)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Using Lemma 12, we can now provide a necessary and sufficient condition
for the existence of non-trivial Nash equilibria for the considered networks.
Lemma 13. Let S = (G,P , P, θ) be a network whose underlying graph has no
source nodes. The joint strategy t0 is a unique Nash equilibrium in G(S) iff
there does not exist a product t and a self-sustaining SCS Ct for t in G.
Proof. (⇐) By Lemma 12.
(⇒) Suppose there exists a self-sustaining SCS Ct for a product t. Let R be the
set of nodes reachable from Ct which eventually can adopt product t. Formally,
R :=
⋃
m∈N Rm where
• R0 := Ct,
• Rm+1 := Rm ∪ {j | t ∈ P (j) and
∑
k∈N(j)∩Rm
wkj ≥ θ(j, t)}.
Let s be the joint strategy such that for all j ∈ R, we have sj = t and for
all k ∈ V \R, we have sk = t0. It follows directly from the definition of R that
s satisfies the following properties:
(P1) for all i ∈ V , si = t0 or si = t,
(P2) for all i ∈ V , si 6= t0 iff i ∈ R,
(P3) for all i ∈ V , if i ∈ R then pi(s) ≥ 0.
We show that s is a Nash equilibrium. Consider first any j such that sj = t
(so sj 6= t0). By (P2) j ∈ R and by (P3) pj(s) ≥ 0. Since pj(s−j , t0) =
0 ≤ pj(s), player j does not gain by deviating to t0. Further, by (P1), for
all k ∈ N(j), sk = t or sk = t0 and therefore for all products t′ 6= t we have
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pj(s−j , t
′) < 0 ≤ pj(s). Thus player j does not gain by deviating to any product
t′ 6= t either.
Next, consider any j such that sj = t0. We have pj(s) = 0 and from (P2) it
follows that j 6∈ R. By the definition of R we have
∑
k∈N(j)∩R
wkj < θ(j, t). Thus
pj(s−j , t) < 0. Moreover, for all products t′ 6= t we also have pj(s−j , t′) < 0 for
the same reason as above. So player j does not gain by a unilateral deviation.
We conclude that s is a Nash equilibrium.
Next, for a product t ∈ P , we define the set Xt :=
⋂
m∈N X
m
t , where
• X0t := {i ∈ V | t ∈ P (i)},
• Xm+1t := {i ∈ V |
∑
j∈N(i)∩Xm
t
wji ≥ θ(i, t)}.
We need the following characterization result.
Lemma 14. Let S be a network whose underlying graph has no source nodes.
There exists a non-trivial Nash equilibrium in G(S) iff there exists a product t
such that Xt 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose S = (G,P , P, θ).
(⇒) It follows directly from the definitions that if there is a self-sustaining SCS
Ct for product t, then Ct ⊆ Xt. Suppose now that for all t, Xt = ∅. Then for
all t, there is no self-sustaining SCS for t. So by Lemma 13, t0 is a unique Nash
equilibrium.
(⇐) Suppose there exists t such that Xt 6= ∅. Let s be the joint strategy defined
as follows:
si :=
{
t if i ∈ Xt
t0 if i 6∈ Xt
By the definition of Xt, for all i ∈ Xt, pi(s) ≥ 0. So no player i ∈ Xt gains
by deviating to t0 (as then his payoff would become 0) or to a product t′ 6= t (as
then his payoff would become negative since no player adopted t′). Also, by the
definition of Xt and of the joint strategy s, for all i 6∈ Xt and for all t′ ∈ P (i),
pi(t
′, s−i) < 0. Therefore, no player i 6∈ Xt gains by deviating to a product t′
either. It follows that s is a Nash equilibrium.
This theorem leads to a direct proof of the claimed result.
Proof of Theorem 11.
We use the following procedure for checking for the existence of a non-trivial
Nash equilibrium.
VerifyNash(S)
found := false;
while P 6= ∅ and ¬found do
choose t ∈ P ;
P := P − {t};
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compute Xt;
found := (Xt 6= ∅)
od
return found
On the account of Lemma 14 this procedure returns true if a non-trivial
Nash equilibrium exists and false otherwise. To assess its complexity, note
that for a network S = (G,P , P, θ) and a fixed product t, the set Xt can be
constructed in time O(n3), where n is the number of nodes in G. Indeed, each
iteration of Xmt requires at most O(n
2) comparisons and the fixed point is
reached after at most n steps. In the worst case, we need to compute Xt for
every t ∈ P , so the procedure runs in time O(|P| · n3).
In fact, the proof of Lemma 14 shows that if a non-trivial Nash equilibrium
exists, then it can be constructed in polynomial time as well. The complexity
changes in the case of determined Nash equilibria.
Theorem 15. For a network S whose underlying graph has no source nodes,
deciding whether the game G(S) has a determined Nash equilibrium is NP-
complete.
Proof. We modify the network given in Figure 2 so that the graph has no source
nodes. To this end we ‘twin’ each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} with a new node i′, also
with the product set {t1, t′1}, by adding edges (i, i
′) and (i′, i). Additionally, we
choose the weights wii′ and wi′i and the corresponding thresholds so that when
i and i′ adopt a common product, their payoff is positive.
For the so modified network we can now repeat the proof of Theorem 3.
6 Finite best response property: general case
We noted already that some social network games do not have a Nash equi-
librium. A fortiori, such games do not have the finite best response property
(FBRP) defined in Subsection 2.1. We now analyze the complexity of determin-
ing whether a game has the FBRP. We establish the following general result.
Theorem 16. Deciding whether for a network S the game G(S) has the FBRP
is co-NP-hard.
Proof. We prove that the complement of the problem is NP-hard. We use
again an instance of the PARTITION problem in the form of n positive rational
numbers (a1, . . ., an), appropriately normalized, so that (this time)
∑n
i=1 ai =
1
2 ,
and the network given in Figure 6. For every node in the network, the product
set is {t1, t2} and for i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we set wia = wib = ai. The other three
weights are 12 . Next, we set θ(a, t1) = θ(b, t2) =
3
4 and stipulate that for other
inputs θ yields 12 .
Suppose now that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem exists, that is for some set S ⊆ {1, . . ., n} we have
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai =
20
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Figure 6: A network related to the FBRP
1
4 . Consider the game G(S). Assume now that strategy t1 is selected by each
node i ∈ S and strategy t2 by each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ S. Identify each
completion of this selection to a strategy profile with the triple of strategies
selected by the nodes a, b and c. Then it is easy to check that Figure 7 exhibits
an infinite best response improvement path in G(S).
(t1,t1,t2) +3___ ___ (t2,t1,t2) +3___ ___ (t2,t1,t1)





(t1,t2,t2)
KS

(t1,t2,t1)ks ______ (t2,t2,t1)ks ______
Figure 7: An infinite best response improvement path
Suppose that an infinite best response improvement path ξ exists in G(S).
The payoff for the node c is always at most 0. Hence t0 is always a best
response for c, so it is never chosen by c in ξ. This means that in ξ, the node c
alternates between the strategies t1 and t2. Hence strategies t1 and t2 are also
infinitely often selected in ξ by the nodes a and b. Consequently, the payoff for
the node a at the moment it switches to t1 has to be ≥ 0 and the payoff for
the node b at the moment it switches to t2 has to be ≥ 0. This means that∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia ≥
1
4 and
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib ≥
1
4 . But
∑n
i=1 ai =
1
2 and
for i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, wia = wib = ai, and si ∈ {t1, t2}. So both above inequalities
are in fact equalities. Consequently there exists a solution to the considered
instance of the PARTITION problem.
It would be interesting to find out precisely the complexity of determining
whether a social network game has the FBRP. We conjecture that it is not
co-NP.
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7 Finite best response improvement property:
special cases
As in the case of Nash equilibria we now analyze the FBRP for social network
games whose underlying graph satisfies certain properties.
7.1 Directed acyclic graphs
We begin with social network games whose underlying graph is a DAG. Then
the following positive result holds.
Theorem 17. Consider a network S whose underlying graph is a DAG. Then
the game G(S) has the FBRP.
This is a direct consequence of a stronger result, Theorem 23 of Section 9.1.
7.2 Simple cycles
The property that the game has the FBRP does not hold anymore when the
underlying graph is a simple cycle. To see this consider Figure 8(a). Suppose
that t¯ is a Nash equilibrium in which each player gets a strictly positive payoff.
Figure 8(b) then shows an infinite best response improvement path. In each
strategy profile, we underline the strategy that is not a best response to the
choice of other players.
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(t,t0,t)ks ______ (t0,t0,t)ks ______
(a) (b)
Figure 8: A network with an infinite best response improvement path
Next consider Figure 9(a). Suppose that both t1 and t2 are Nash equilibria.
Then Figure 9(b) shows an infinite best response improvement path. This es-
sentially repeats the reasoning used to show that the network given in Figure 6
has an infinite best response improvement path.
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Figure 9: Another network with an infinite best response improvement path
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One can easily generalize the above two examples to simple cycles with more
than three nodes. Below we show that when the game does not have the FBRP,
the network is necessarily of one of the above two types. This will allow us to
establish the following complexity result concerning the FBRP property.
Theorem 18. Consider a network S = (G,P , P, θ) such that G is a simple
cycle. There is a procedure that runs in time O(|P| · n), where n is the number
of nodes in G, that decides whether the game G(S) has the FBRP.
We need the following characterization result.
Theorem 19. Let S be a network whose underlying graph is a simple cycle.
(i) Suppose that S has 2 nodes. Then the game G(S) has the FBRP.
(ii) Suppose that S has at least 3 nodes. Then the game G(S) does not have
the FBRP iff either it has a determined Nash equilibrium s such that for
all i, pi(s) > 0 or it has two determined Nash equilibria.
Proof. (i) A simple analysis, which we leave to the reader, shows that the longest
possible improvement path is of length five and is of the form (t1, t2), (t0, t2),
(t2, t2), (t2, t0), (t0, t0).
(ii) (⇒ ) Consider an infinite best response improvement path ξ. Some node
changes his strategy in ξ infinitely often. This means that some node, say i,
selects in ξ some product t infinitely often. Indeed, otherwise from some moment
on in each strategy profile in ξ its strategy would be t0, which is not the case.
Each time node i switches in ξ to the product t, it selects a best response, so
its payoff becomes at least 0. Consequently, at the moment of such a switch its
predecessor i⊖ 1’s strategy is necessarily t as well. So if from some moment on
node i⊖1 does not switch from the strategy t, then node i does not switch from
t either. This shows that node i⊖ 1 also selects in ξ product t infinitely often.
Iterating this reasoning we conclude that each node selects in ξ the product t
infinitely often. Therefore, for all i, t ∈ P (i). Since the payoff of i depends only
on the choice of i⊖ 1, we also have that pi(t) ≥ 0 for all i. By Theorem 8, t¯ is
a Nash equilibrium.
This shows that if a node selects in ξ some product t1 infinitely often, then
all nodes select in ξ the product t1 infinitely often and t1 is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose now that t¯ is a unique determined Nash equilibrium. This means that
all other products are selected in ξ finitely often. So from some moment on in ξ
nodes select only t or t0. In this suffix η of ξ each node selects t infinitely often.
Further, each switch to t from t0 is a better response. Hence each time a node
switches in η to t its payoff becomes > 0. This shows that t¯ is a determined
Nash equilibrium such that for all i, pi(t¯) > 0.
(⇐ ) Suppose first that the game G(S) has a determined Nash equilibrium s
such that for all i, pi(s) > 0. By Theorem 8 s is of the form t¯ for some product
t. Then consider the following strategy profile:
s := (t, . . ., t, t0).
23
First schedule node 1 that has a better response, namely t0. Next, schedule
node n for which t is a best response. After these two steps the strategy profile
becomes a rotation of s by 1. Iterating this selection procedure we obtain an
infinite best response improvement path.
Next, suppose that the game G(S) has two determined Nash equilibria. By
Theorem 8 they are of the form t1 and t2 for some products t1 and t2. Then
consider the following strategy profile:
s := (t1, . . ., t1, t2).
First schedule node 1 for which t2 is a best response. Next, schedule node n for
which t1 is a best response. After these two steps the strategy profile becomes a
rotation of s by 1. Iterating this selection procedure we obtain an infinite best
response improvement path.
This theorem leads to a direct proof of the claimed result.
Proof of Theorem 18.
Thanks to the above theorem, one can check whether G(S) has the FBRP
as follows. First apply the procedure VerifyNashCycle(S) defined in the proof of
Theorem 9, appropriately modified to check for the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium with strictly positive payoffs. If such an equilibrium does not exist, then
we use a modified version of VerifyNashCycle(S) to check whether G(S) has two
determined Nash equilibria.
7.3 Graphs with no source nodes
As in Section 5 we conclude by considering social networks whose underlying
graphs have no source nodes. The following counterpart of Theorem 16 holds.
Theorem 20. For a network S whose underlying graph has no source nodes,
deciding whether the game G(S) has the FBRP is co-NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is a modification of the proof of Theorem 16. Given an instance
of the PARTITION problem we use the following modification of the network
given in Figure 6. We ‘twin’ each node i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with a new node i′, also
with the product set {t1, t2}, by adding the edges (i, i′) and (i′, i). We choose
the weights wii′ , wi′i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the thresholds so that when i
and i′ adopt a common product, their payoffs are positive.
Suppose that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION prob-
lem exists. Then we extend the joint strategy considered in the proof of The-
orem 16 by additionally assigning t1 to each node i′ such that i ∈ S and t2 to
each node i′ such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ S. Then, as before, there is no finite
best response improvement path starting in this joint strategy, so G(S) does not
have the FBRP.
Suppose that an infinite best response improvement path ξ exists in G(S). By
Theorem 19(i) each network consisting of just the twined nodes (1, 1′), . . . , (n, n′)
has the FBRP. Therefore there exists a joint strategy sk in ξ such that in the
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(infinite) suffix of ξ starting at sk (call it ξk), none of the following nodes are
scheduled: 1, 1′, . . . , n, n′. The payoff for node c in ξk is at most 0. Hence t0 is
always a best response for it. If c chooses t0 in ξ then clearly ξ is finite which
contradicts the assumption. Also, if there exists a sm in ξk such that c never
changes its strategy in the suffix of ξk starting at sm, then again ξ is finite. This
means that in ξk the node c alternates between the strategies t1 and t2. Hence
in ξk strategies t1 and t2 are also infinitely often selected by the nodes a and b.
Consequently, the payoff for the node a at the moment it switches to t1 has to
be ≥ 0 and the payoff for the node b at the moment it switches to t2 has to be
≥ 0. This means that
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia ≥
1
4 and
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib ≥
1
4 .
But
∑n
i=1 ai =
1
2 and for i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, wia = wib = ai, and si ∈ {t1, t2}.
So both above inequalities are in fact equalities. Consequently there exists a
solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION problem.
8 Finite improvement property: general case
In the previous section we noted that some social network games do not have
the FBRP. A fortiori, such games do not have the FIP either. We now analyze
the complexity of determining whether a game has the FIP. We start with the
following analogue of Theorem 16, though the proof is more complex.
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Figure 10: A network related to the FIP
Theorem 21. Deciding whether for a network S the game G(S) has the FIP is
co-NP-hard.
Proof. We prove that the complement of the problem is NP-hard. We use
again an instance of the PARTITION problem in the form of n positive rational
numbers (a1, . . ., an), appropriately normalised, so that (this time)
∑n
i=1 ai =
1
2 ,
and the network given in Figure 10. For each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we set the
product set to be {t1, t2} and wia = wib = ai. The weights of the other edges
are shown in the figure.
Since for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ai is rational, it has the form ai = liri . Let
τ = 14·r1·...·rn . The following property holds.
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Property 1. Given an instance (a1, . . . , an) of the PARTITION problem and
τ defined as above, for all S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
(i) if
∑
i∈S ai <
1
4 , then
∑
i∈S ai ≤
1
4 − τ ,
(ii) if
∑
i∈S ai >
1
4 , then
∑
i∈S ai ≥
1
4 + τ .
Proof. By definition, each ai and 14 is a multiple of τ . Thus
∑
i∈S ai = x · τ and
1
4 = y · τ where x and y are integers.
(i) If x · τ < y · τ , then x · τ ≤ (y − 1) · τ . Therefore
∑
i∈S ai ≤
1
4 − τ .
The proof of (ii) is analogous.
Note that given (a1, . . . , an), τ can be defined in polynomial time. Let the
thresholds be defined as follows: θ(a, t2) = 12 , θ(a, t3) =
1
4 + τ , θ(b, t1) =
1
2 ,
θ(b, t2) =
1
2 + τ and for node c, θ(c, t1) = θ(c, t3) =
1
4 .
Suppose now that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem exists. That is, for some set S ⊆ {1, . . ., n} we have
∑
i∈S ai =∑
i6∈S ai =
1
4 . Consider the game G(S). Assume now that strategy t1 is se-
lected by each node i ∈ S, strategy t2 by each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ S and
that the node labelled by {t3} selected strategy t3. Identify each completion
of this selection to a joint strategy with the triple of strategies selected by the
nodes a, b and c. Then it is easy to check that Figure 11(a) exhibits an infinite
improvement path in G(S); for convenience we list the corresponding payoffs in
Figure 11(b).
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Figure 11: An infinite improvement path and the corresponding payoffs
Conversely, we show that if there is no solution to the considered instance
of the PARTITION problem, then the game G(S) has the FIP. Consider an
improvement path ξ. Let k ≥ 0 be the first index (of a joint strategy) in ξ
such that in the suffix of ξ starting at k, none of the source nodes is anymore
scheduled. Let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, sk the k-th element of ξ, Val(t1) =∑
i∈[n]|sk
i
=t1
ai and Val(t2) =
∑
i∈[n]|sk
i
=t2
ai. There are two cases.
Case 1: Val(t2) <
1
4 . By Property 1, it follows that Val(t2) ≤
1
4 − τ . We argue
that t2 is never a better response for node a. Suppose ska = t3. We have the
following two possibilities:
• skc = t3; then pa(s
k) = 12 − τ , so t3 is node a’s best response,
• skc 6= t3; then pa(s
k) = − 14 − τ . If node a switches to t2, then the payoff
is pa(sk−a, t2) ≤ (
1
4 − τ) −
1
2 = −
1
4 − τ . Thus t2 is not a better response
for a.
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Similarly, it is easy to check that if ska = t0, then t2 is not a better response
for node a. If node a never changes its strategy in ξ then clearly ξ is finite. If
it does, then let ka > k be the first index in ξ such that node a changes its
strategy (i.e., ska 6= s
ka
a ). Since t2 is never a better response for a, in the suffix of
ξ (call it ξa) starting at ka, node a never chooses t2. In ξa the better response of
node b can be t1, t2 or t0. However, since node a never chooses t2, b’s payoff in
ξa depends only on the choice made by the source nodes (which never changes
in ξa). Therefore, there exists an index kb in ξ, where k < ka < kb, such that in
the suffix of ξ starting at kb (call it ξb), node b never changes its strategy. The
payoff of node c depends on the choice made by nodes b and the source node
marked {t3}. Since in ξb node b never changes its strategy, there is a suffix of ξb
in which node c never changes its strategy. Therefore ξb, and hence ξ is finite.
Case 2: Val(t2) >
1
4 . By Property 1, it follows that Val(t2) ≥
1
4 + τ . We argue
that t1 is never a better response for node b. Suppose skb = t2. We have the
following two possibilities:
• ska = t2; then pb(s
k) ≥ 12 , so t2 is node b’s best response,
• if ska 6= t2, then pb(s
k) ≥ (14 + τ) −
1
2 − τ = −
1
4 . If node b switches to t1,
then since Val(t1) < 14 , the payoff is pb(s
k
−b, t1) <
1
4 −
1
2 = −
1
4 . Thus t1 is
not a better response for b.
Similarly, it is easy to check that if skb = t0 then t1 is not a better response
for node b. This implies that there exists an index kb > k in ξ such that for the
suffix of ξ (call it ξb) starting at kb, node b never chooses t1. In ξb, since node
b never chooses t1, the better response of node c can be either t3 or t0. Thus
c’s payoff in ξb depends only on the choice made by the source node labelled by
{t3}. Therefore, there exists an index kc in ξ, where k < kb < kc, such that in
the suffix of ξ starting at kc (call it ξc), node c is never scheduled. It follows
that ξc and hence ξ is finite.
Since the choice of the improvement path was arbitrary, it follows that G(S)
has the FIP.
9 Finite improvement property: special cases
In this section we clarify whether the special classes of social network games
have the FIP and if not, what the complexity of the problem is.
First, we would like to mention the following question to which we did not
succeed to find an answer.
Open problem: Consider a network S whose underlying graph is a simple
cycle. What is the complexity of determining whether G(S) has the FIP?
In what follows we make use of the following simple observation.
Note 22. Consider a game G(S). If a node i is infinitely often selected in an
improvement path, then so is a node j ∈ N(i). ✷
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9.1 Graphs with special strongly connected components
We begin with the strategic games associated with the networks whose under-
lying graph is a DAG. Then the following positive result holds.
Theorem 23. Consider a network S whose underlying graph is a DAG. Then
the game G(S) has the FIP.
Proof. Suppose not. Then by repeatedly using Note 22 we obtain an infinite
path in the underlying graph. This yields a contradiction.
We now generalize this result to a larger class of directed graphs. First we
consider the case of two player games.
Theorem 24. Every two player social network game has the FIP.
Proof. By Theorem 23 we can assume that the underlying graph is a cycle, say
1→ 2 → 1. Consider an improvement path ρ. By removing, if necessary, some
steps we can assume that the players alternate their moves in ρ.
In what follows given an element of ρ (that is not the last one) we underline
the strategy of the player who moves, i.e., selects a better response. We call
each element of ρ of the type (t, t) or (t, t) a match and use ⇒ to denote the
transition between two consecutive joint strategies in ρ. Further, we shorten the
statement “each time player i switches his strategy his payoff strictly increases
and it never decreases when his opponent switches strategy” to “player i’s payoff
steadily goes up”.
Consider now two successive matches in ρ, based respectively on the strate-
gies t and t1. The corresponding segment of ρ is one of the following four types.
Type 1. (t, t)⇒∗ (t1, t1).
The fragment of ρ that starts at (t, t) and finishes at (t1, t1) has the following
form:
(t, t)⇒ (t2, t)⇒
∗ (t1, t3)⇒ (t1, t1).
Note that player 1’s payoff can drop in a segment of ρ only if this segment
contains a transition of the form (t′, t′)⇒ (t′, t1). So in the considered segment
player 1’s payoff steadily goes up. Additionally, in the step (t1, t3)⇒ (t1, t1) his
payoff increases by w21.
In turn, in the step (t, t) ⇒ (t2, t) player 2’s payoff decreases by w12 and in
the remaining steps his payoff steadily goes up. So p1(t¯) + w21 < p1(t1) and
p2(t¯)− w12 < p2(t1).
Type 2. (t, t)⇒∗ (t1, t1).
For the analogous reason as above player 1’s payoff steadily goes up. In
turn, in the first step of (t, t)⇒∗ (t1, t1) the payoff of player 2 decreases by w12,
while in the last step (in which player 1 moves) his payoff increases by w12. So
these two payoff changes cancel each other. Additionally, in the remaining steps
player 2’s payoff steadily goes up. So p1(t¯) < p1(t1) and p2(t¯) < p2(t1).
Type 3. (t, t)⇒∗ (t1, t1).
This type is symmetric to Type 2, so p1(t¯) < p1(t1) and p2(t¯) < p2(t1).
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Type 4. (t, t)⇒∗ (t1, t1).
This type is symmetric to Type 1, so p1(t¯)−w21 < p1(t1) and p2(t¯)+w12 <
p2(t1).
We summarize in Table 1 the changes in the payoffs p1 and p2 between the
considered two matches.
Type p1 p2
1 increases decreases
by > w21 by < w12
2, 3 increases increases
4 decreases increases
by < w21 by > w12
Table 1: Changes in p1 and p2
Consider now a match (t, t) in ρ and a match (t1, t1) that appears later in
ρ. Let Ti denote the number of internal segments of type i that occur in the
fragment of ρ that starts with (t, t) and ends with (t1, t1).
Case 1. T1 ≥ T4.
Then Table 1 shows that the aggregate increase in p1 in segments of type 1
exceeds the aggregate decrease in segments of type 4. So p1(t¯) < p1(t1).
Case 2. T1 < T4.
Then analogously Table 1 shows that p2(t¯) < p2(t1).
We conclude that t 6= t1. By symmetry the same conclusion holds if the
considered matches are of the form (t, t) and (t1, t1). This proves that each
match occurs in ρ at most once. So in some suffix η of ρ no match occurs. But
each step in η increases the social welfare, so η is finite, and consequently ρ
is.
In social network games the players share at least one strategy, t0, that
ensures each of them the zero payoff. Also, the weights and thresholds are
drawn from specific intervals. However, these properties are not used in the
above proof. As a result the above proof shows that each of the following two
player games has the FIP.
• The set of strategies of player i is a finite set Si,
• the payoff function is defined by pi(s) := fi(si) + ai(si = s−i), where
fi : Si → R, ai > 0 and (si = s−i) is defined by
(si = s−i) :=
{
1 if si = s−i
0 otherwise
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Intuitively, ai can be viewed as a bonus for player i for coordinating with his
opponent.
It is worthwhile to notice that if we allowed that the weights depend on the
product and modified the definition of the payoff function to∑
j∈N t
i
(s)
wji(t)− θ(i, t),
then the above result would not hold.
Example 25. Suppose that the product sets of player 1 and player 2 are
{t1, t2, t3} and {t1, t3, t4} respectively. Define the threshold functions as fol-
lows:
θ(1, t1) = 0.9, θ(1, t2) = 0.8, θ(1, t3) = 1,
θ(2, t1) = 1, θ(2, t3) = 0.9, θ(2, t4) = 0.8,
and suppose the parametrized weight functions are such that
w21(t1) = 0, w21(t3) = 0.3, w12(t1) = 0.3, w12(t3) = 0.
Then it is easy to check that the iteration of the following sequence forms
an infinite improvement path:
(t1, t1)⇒ (t2, t1)⇒ (t2, t3)⇒ (t3, t3)⇒ (t3, t4)⇒ (t1, t4)⇒ (t1, t1).
✷
We can now draw a conclusion about a larger class of social network games.
Theorem 26. Consider a network S such that each strongly connected compo-
nent of the underlying graph is a cycle of length 2. Then the game G(S) has the
FIP.
Proof. Suppose S = (G,P , P, θ). Consider the condensation of G, i.e., the DAG
G′ resulting from contracting each cycle of G to a single node. We enumerate
the nodes of G using the function rank() (introduced in Subsection 5.1) such
that if rank(i) < rank(j), then there is no path in G from j to i, and subse-
quently modify it to an enumeration rank′() of the nodes of G′, by replacing
each contraction of a cycle by its two nodes.
Suppose now that an infinite improvement path ρ in G(S) exists. Choose
the first node i in the enumeration rank′() that is infinitely often selected in ρ.
By Note 22 i lies on a cycle, say i→ i′ → i, in G. Consider a suffix of ρ in which
the nodes that precede i in rank′() do not appear anymore. In particular, by the
choice of i, the neighbours of i or i′ precede i in rank′(), so they do not appear
in this suffix either. Delete from each element of this suffix the strategies of the
nodes that differ from i and i′. We obtain in this way an infinite improvement
path in the two player game G′ associated with the weighted directed graph
related to the cycle i→ i′ → i, which contradicts Theorem 24.
There is a small subtlety in the last step that we should clarify. The payoff
functions in the game G′ need to take into account the weights of the edges from
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all the neighbours of i and i′ and the final strategies chosen by these neighbours.
For instance, in the case of the directed graph from Figure 12 the game G′ has
the players i and i′ but the weights of the edges k → i and k → i′ and the
final strategy of node k need to be taken into account in the computation of the
payoff functions for, respectively, nodes i and i′.
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Figure 12: A directed graph
So the game G′ is not exactly the social network game associated with the
weighted directed graph related to i→ i′ → i. However, the observation stated
after the proof of Theorem 24 allows us to conclude that G′ does have the
FIP.
9.2 Graphs with no source nodes
We conclude with the following analogue of Theorem 20.
Theorem 27. For a network S whose underlying graph has no source nodes,
deciding whether the game G(S) has the FIP is co-NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is a modification of Theorem 21. Given an instance of the
PARTITION problem we use the following modification of the network given in
Figure 10. We ‘twin’ each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} with a new node i′, also with the
product set {t1, t2}, by adding the edges (i, i′) and (i′, i). We also ‘twin’ the
node marked {t3}, call it d, with a new node d′ also with the product set {t3},
by adding the edges (d, d′) and (d′, d). Next, we choose the weights wii′ , wi′i,
where i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, and wdd′ and wd′d and the corresponding thresholds so that
when i and i′ or d and d′ adopt a common product, their payoffs are positive.
Suppose that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION prob-
lem exists. Then we extend the joint strategy considered in the proof of Theo-
rem 21 by additionally assigning t1 to each node i′ such that i ∈ S, t2 to each
node i′ such that i ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ S and t3 to nodes d and d′. Then, as before,
there is no finite improvement path starting in this joint strategy, so G(S) does
not have the FIP.
Suppose that no solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem exists. We show that then the game has the FIP. Consider an improve-
ment path ξ. By Theorem 24, each network consisting of just the twined nodes
(1, 1′), . . . , (n, n′) and (d, d′) has the FIP. Therefore, there exists a joint strategy
sk in ξ such that in the suffix of ξ starting at sk, none of the following nodes
are scheduled: 1, 1′, . . . , n, n′, d, d′. Again, we have the two cases as analysed in
Theorem 21. When Val(t2) < 14 , using the same argument as in Theorem 21 we
conclude that the improvement path ξ is finite. In the case when Val(t2) > 14
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the argument in Theorem 21 shows that there exists an index kb > k in ξ such
that for the suffix of ξ starting at kb (call it ξb), node b never chooses t1. If d
and d′ choose t0 in sk, since b never chooses t1 in ξb, the better response of c in
ξb is t0. From this it follows that ξb and hence ξ is finite. If d and d′ choose t3
in sk, then it follows by the argument given in Theorem 21 that ξ is finite.
10 The uniform FIP property: general case
Let us reconsider the games associated with the networks from Figures 8(a) and
9(a). Since these games do not have the FBRP, by definition, they do not have
the FIP either. In spite of this fact, for any initial joint strategy there exists
a finite improvement path. Indeed, it suffices to schedule the players in the
clockwise manner, that is to choose each time the first player who did not select
a best response. This is an instance of a more general result proved in the next
section.
By a scheduler we mean a function f that given a joint strategy s that
is not a Nash equilibrium selects a player who did not select a best response
in s. An improvement path ξ = s1, s2, . . . respects a scheduler f if for all k
smaller than the length of ξ, sk+1 = (s′i, s
k
−i), where f(s
k) = i. We say that a
strategic game has the uniform FIP if there exists a scheduler f such that all
improvement paths ρ which respect f are finite.
In this and the next section we investigate the complexity of determining
whether a social network game has the uniform FIP. We begin by establishing
the following counterpart of Theorem 21.
Theorem 28. Deciding whether for a network S the game G(S) has the uniform
FIP is co-NP-hard.
Proof. We prove that the complement of the problem is NP-hard. As before we
use an instance of the PARTITION problem in the form of n positive rational
numbers (a1, . . ., an) such that
∑n
i=1 ai = 1. To construct the appropriate
network S, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we employ the networks given in
Figures 1 and 2. However, we use different product sets in the second network
and combine these two networks differently.
For each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we set P (i) = {t1, t2}. Further we set P (a) =
{t1} and P (b) = {t2}. As before we set wia = wib = ai and we assume that the
threshold of the nodes a and b is constant and equals 12 . We now identify the
nodes a and b of the network from Figure 2 respectively with the nodes marked
by {t1} and {t2} in the network in Figure 1. The resulting network is given in
Figure 13.
Suppose now that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem exists, that is for some set S ⊆ {1, . . ., n} we have
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i6∈S ai =
1
2 . Consider the game G(S). Take the joint strategy s formed by the following
strategies:
• t1 assigned to each node i ∈ S and the nodes a and c,
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Figure 13: A network related to the uniform FIP
• t2 assigned to each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ S and the nodes b and d,
• t3 assigned to the nodes e and g.
Any improvement path that starts in this joint strategy will not change the
strategies assigned to the nodes a, b and g. So if such an improvement path
terminates, it produces a Nash equilibrium in the game associated with the
network given in Figure 1 of Example 2. But we showed there that this game
does not have a Nash equilibrium. Consequently, there is no finite improvement
path in the game G(S) that starts in the above joint strategy and a fortiori G(S)
does not have the uniform FIP.
Suppose now that no solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem exists. We show that then the game G(S) has the uniform FIP. To this
end we order the nodes of S as follows (note the positions of the nodes c, d and
e):
1, 2, . . ., n, a, b, g, c, e, d.
Consider the scheduler f that given a joint strategy selects the first node in the
above list that did not select a best response. (An aside: a node can be selected
more than once – such a possibility is discussed in the second case below.)
Take an improvement path that respects this scheduler. After at most n
steps the nodes 1, 2, . . ., n all selected a product t1 or t2. Suppose first that∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia >
1
2 .
In the considered improvement path eventually the following selections have
been made by the nodes a, b, g, c and e:
a : t1, b : t0, g : t3, c : t1, e : t1.
Either the node d initially selected t0 or it is eventually scheduled and then
it switches to t0. At this moment a Nash equilibrium is reached, that is, the
considered improvement path is finite.
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Suppose next that
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib >
1
2 . Then after a number of steps
the following selections have been made by the nodes a, b and g:
a : t0, b : t2, g : t3.
Either the node c initially selected t0 or t2, or it is eventually scheduled
and then it switches to t0 or t2. Further, either the node e initially selected
t3 or it is eventually scheduled and then it switches to t3. Finally, if the node
d is eventually scheduled, then it switches to t3, as well. If now the node c is
scheduled again, then it switches to t0. At this moment a Nash equilibrium is
reached and the considered improvement path terminates.
11 The uniform FIP: special cases
As in the case of the Nash equilibria and the FIP we now consider the uniform
FIP for the special cases of social network games.
11.1 Simple cycles
In the case when the underlying graph is a simple cycle the following positive
result holds.
Theorem 29. Let S be a network such that the underlying graph is a simple
cycle. Then the game G(S) has the uniform FIP.
Proof. We use the scheduler f that given a joint strategy s chooses the smallest
index i such that si is not a best response to s−i. So this scheduler selects a
player again if he did not switch to a best response. Therefore we can assume
that each selected player immediately selects a best response.
Consider a joint strategy s taken from a best response improvement path.
Observe that for all k if sk ∈ P (k) and pk(s) ≥ 0 (so in particular if sk is a best
response to s−k), then sk = sk⊖1. Consequently the following property holds
for all i > 1:
Z(i): if f(s) = i and si−1 ∈ P (i− 1) then for all j ∈ {n, 1, . . ., i− 1}, sj = si−1.
In words: if i is the first player who did not choose a best response and player
i − 1 strategy is a product, then this product is the strategy of every earlier
player and of player n.
Along each best response improvement path that respects f the value of
f(s) strictly increases until the path terminates or at certain stage f(s) = n.
In the latter case if sn−1 = t0, then the unique best response for player n is
t0. Otherwise sn−1 ∈ P (n− 1), so on the account of property Z(n) all players’
strategies equal the same product and the payoff of player n is negative (since
f(s) = n). So the unique best response for player n is t0, as well.
This switch begins a new round with player 1 as the next scheduled player.
Player 1 also switches to t0 and from now on every consecutive player switches
to t0, as well. The resulting path terminates once player n−2 switches to t0.
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Another scheduler f that we could use is the one that given s chooses the
smallest index i such that pi(s) < 0. Note that if pi(s) < 0, then i does not play
a best response in s. The argument is the same as for the above scheduler.
These two schedulers differ. Take for instance the network given in Fig-
ure 9 and the initial joint strategy (t2, t2, t1). The following improvement path
terminating in the trivial Nash equilibrium respects the second scheduler:
(t2, t2, t1)⇒ (t0, t2, t1)⇒ (t0, t0, t1)⇒ (t0, t0, t0).
However, using the first scheduler, node 1 is scheduled again in the joint
strategy (t0, t2, t1) since t0 is not its best response and similarly for node 2.
Thus the improvement path terminates in the Nash equilibrium (t1, t1, t1).
11.2 Graphs with no source nodes
Finally, we consider social network games in the case when the underlying graph
has no source nodes. Then it is possible that for some initial joint strategy no
improvement path starting at it terminates, so in particular the game does not
have the uniform FIP. To see this consider the network given in Figure 14(a).
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Figure 14: Another network with an infinite improvement path
We assume that each threshold is a constant θ, where θ < w1 < w2. Consider
the joint strategy s, in which the nodes marked by {t1}, {t2} and {t3} choose
the unique product in their product sets and players 1, 2 and 3 choose t1, t1 and
t2, respectively. For convenience, we denote s by (t1, t1, t2). This joint strategy
is not a Nash equilibrium since player 1 gains by deviating to t2. There is a
unique improvement path starting at s and this path is infinite. It is shown in
Figure 14(b). In each joint strategy, we underline the strategy that is not a best
response.
By using a more complex network that builds upon the above one we now
prove the following analogue of Theorem 28.
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Theorem 30. For a network S whose underlying graph has no source nodes,
deciding whether the game G(S) has the uniform FIP is co-NP-hard.
Proof. The proof extends the proof of Theorem 28. Given an instance of the
PARTITION problem we use the following modification of the network given in
Figure 13. We ‘twin’ each node i ∈ {1, . . ., n} with a new node i′, also with the
product set {t1, t2}, by adding the edges (i, i′) and (i′, i). We also ‘twin’ the
node g with a new node g′, also with the product set {t3}, by adding the edges
(g, g′) and (g′, g). Next, we choose the weights wii′ , wi′i, where i ∈ {1, . . ., n},
and wgg′ and wg′g and the corresponding thresholds so that when i and i′ or g
and g′ adopt a common product, their payoff is positive.
Suppose that a solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION prob-
lem exists. Then we extend the joint strategy considered in the proof of Theo-
rem 28 by additionally assigning t1 to each node i′ such that i ∈ S, t2 to each
node i′ such that i ∈ {1, . . ., n} \S and t3 to the node g′. Then, as before, there
is no finite improvement path starting in this joint strategy, so G(S) does not
have uniform FIP.
Suppose now that no solution to the considered instance of the PARTITION
problem exists. We show that then the game G(S) has the uniform FIP. To this
end we now use the following order of the nodes of S:
1, 1′, 2, 2′, . . ., n, n′, g, g′, a, b, c, e, d,
and as before use the scheduler that ‘follows’ this ordering. (The reader may
notice that the primed nodes will never be scheduled.)
When considering the possible joint strategies in G(S) we now need to con-
sider new cases when after being scheduled some of the nodes i ∈ {1, . . ., n} or
g end up selecting the strategy t0. In each case the reasoning is similar as in
the proof of Theorem 28 and allows us to conclude that each improvement path
terminates with a Nash equilibrium. We only mention the final selection of the
strategies by the nodes a, b, c, d, e and g and leave checking the details to the
reader.
Case 1.
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia <
1
2 ,
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib <
1
2 and g selects t3.
The final selection of the strategies by the nodes a, b, c, d and e is then
a : t0, b : t0, c : t0, d : t3, e : t3.
Case 2.
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia <
1
2 ,
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib <
1
2 and g selects t0.
The final selection of the strategies by the nodes a, b, c, d and e is then
a : t0, b : t0, c : t0, d : t0, e : t0.
Case 3.
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia ≥
1
2 ,
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib <
1
2 and g selects t3.
The final selection of the strategies by the nodes a, b, c, d and e is then
a : t1, b : t0, c : t1, d : t0, e : t1 or a : t0, b : t0, c : t0, d : t3, e : t3,
(where the latter can only arise when
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia =
1
2 ).
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Case 4.
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia ≥
1
2 ,
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib <
1
2 and g selects t0.
The final selection of the strategies by the nodes a, b, c, d and e is then
a : t1, b : t0, c : t1, d : t0, e : t1 or a : t0, b : t0, c : t0, d : t0, e : t0,
(where the latter can only arise when
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia =
1
2 ).
Case 5.
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia <
1
2 ,
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib ≥
1
2 and g selects t3.
The final selection of the strategies by the nodes a, b, c, d and e is then
a : t0, b : t2, c : t0, d : t3, e : t3 or a : t0, b : t0, c : t0, d : t3, e : t3,
(where the latter can only arise when
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib =
1
2 ).
Case 6.
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t1 wia <
1
2 ,
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib ≥
1
2 and g selects t0.
The final selection of the strategies by the nodes a, b, c, d and e is then
a : t0, b : t2, c : t2, d : t2, e : t0 or a : t0, b : t0, c : t0, d : t0, e : t0,
(where the latter can only arise when
∑
i∈{1,. . .,n}|si=t2 wib =
1
2 ).
This proves that G(S) has the uniform FIP.
Analogously to the notion of a game having the uniform FIP one can intro-
duce the notion of a game having the uniform FBRP, by simply restricting
attention to the best response improvement paths. It is easy to check that all
the proofs given in this section show that the obtained results also hold when
we replace the reference to the uniform FIP by that to the uniform FBRP. In
fact, the latter property admits less improvement paths, so some proofs become
simpler. We shall return to this matter in the last section.
12 Weakly acyclic games
Finally, we show that for the social network games the property of being weakly
acyclic is weaker than that of having the uniform FIP.
Example 31. Consider the network S given in Figure 15(a). This is essentially
the network in Figure 1 except for the addition of the new source node with
the product set {t4} as a neighbour of node 1 and the new product t4 included
in the product sets of players 1,2 and 3. We assume that each threshold is a
constant θ, where θ < w3 < w1 < w2.
We first show that the game G(S) does not have the uniform FIP. Assume
that each source node selects its unique product. Identify each joint strategy
that extends this selection with the selection of the strategies by the players 1,
2 and 3. Consider the infinite improvement path starting at the joint strategy
s = (t1, t1, t2) shown in Figure 15(b). In each joint strategy in this improvement
path, there is a unique player who is not playing his best response. Therefore,
irrespective of the scheduler chosen, there is always a unique player who can be
scheduled. It follows that G(S) does not have the uniform FIP.
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Figure 15: A weakly acyclic game that does not have the uniform FIP
On the other hand, this game is weakly acyclic. It suffices to consider joint
strategies in which each source node selects its unique product. First note that
any improvement path in which player 1 never adopts product t2 is finite since
he cannot switch from t1 to t4. We have the following cases, where as above,
we only list the strategies of players 1, 2 and 3.
Case 1. s = (t2, x, y) where y 6= t2. Then by definition p1(s) < 0. If x 6= t4
then consider the improvement path s = (t2, x, y) ⇒ (t4, x, y) ⇒ (t4, t4, y) ⇒
(t4, t4, t4). So player 1 first switches to t4 (which is a better response) instead
of switching to t1 (which is the best response) and subsequently players 2 and
3 switch to t4. This results in the joint strategy (t4, t4, t4) which is a Nash
equilibrium. If x = t4 then we have a shorter improvement path (t4, t4, y) ⇒
(t4, t4, t4).
Case 2. s = (t2, x, t2). If x 6= t3 then (t2, x, t2)⇒ (t2, t3, t2)⇒ (t2, t3, t3). If x =
t3 then (t2, x, t2)⇒ (t2, t3, t3). But the proof of Case 1 shows that (t2, t3, t3)⇒∗
(t4, t4, t4), so irrespective of the value of x there is a finite improvement path
starting in s. ✷
In turn, there are social network games which have Nash equilibria but are
not weakly acyclic.
Example 32. Consider the modification of the network in Figure 15 where we
‘twin’ the node with product set {t4}, call it 4, with a new node 5 also with the
product set {t4} by adding edges (4, 5) and (5, 4). Let the weight of each new
edge be a constant w ≥ θ. From the previous example, it is easy to see that the
joint strategy (t4, t4, t4, t4, t4) (where we list the choice of nodes 1 to 5) is a Nash
equilibrium. On the other hand, consider the joint strategy s = (t1, t1, t2, t0, t0).
It corresponds to the joint strategy (t1, t1, t2) analysed in Example 2, where we
showed that every improvement path starting at it is infinite. The same holds
here and therefore the game is not weakly acyclic. ✷
Theorem 33. For an arbitrary network (respectively, a network whose under-
lying graph has no source nodes) S, deciding whether the game G(S) is weakly
acyclic is co-NP-hard.
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Proof. Consider the case of an arbitrary network. In the proof of Theorem 28 we
showed that if a solution to the instance of the PARTITION problem exists then
in the associated game G(S), there is a joint strategy s such that all improvement
paths starting in s are infinite. This implies that G(S) is not weakly acyclic.
Conversely, if there is no solution to the instance of the PARTITION problem
then there is a scheduler f such that all improvement paths in G(S) that respects
f are finite. This implies that G(S) is weakly acyclic.
The proof for the case of a network whose underlying graph has no source
nodes is analogous and uses the proof of Theorem 30.
13 Concluding remarks
13.1 Summary of the results
In this paper we studied various aspects of product adoption by agents who form
a social network by focussing on a natural class of strategic games associated
with the class of social networks introduced in [2]. We identified three natural
types of (pure) Nash equilibria in these games: arbitrary, non-trivial, and deter-
mined, and focussed on games associated with four classes of social networks:
arbitrary ones and those whose underlying graph is a DAG, or a simple cycle, or
has no source nodes. We also showed that the price of anarchy and the price of
stability is unbounded, even if we limit ourselves to the social networks whose
underlying graph is a DAG or has no source nodes.
Further, we studied the finite best response property (FBRP), the finite
improvement property (FIP) and also introduced a new class of games that have
the uniform FIP. The following table summarizes our complexity and existence
results, where we refer to the underlying graph having n nodes.
property arbitrary DAG simple cycle no source
nodes
Arbitrary NE NP-complete always exists always exists always exists
Non-trivial NE NP-complete always exists O(|P| · n) O(|P| · n3)
Determined NE NP-complete NP-complete O(|P| · n) NP-complete
FBRP co-NP-hard yes O(|P| · n) co-NP-hard
FIP co-NP-hard yes ? co-NP-hard
Uniform FIP co-NP-hard yes yes co-NP-hard
Weakly acyclic co-NP-hard yes yes co-NP-hard
We also mentioned in the Section 11 the notion of a game having the uniform
FBRP. In a recent paper, [4], we developed the notion of schedulers further and
in particular showed that for finite games the notions of having the uniform FIP
and the uniform FBRP are equivalent. This provides another way of showing
that the results of the previous section also hold for the latter notion.
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13.2 Final comments
In the definition of the social network games we took a number of simplifying
assumptions. In particular, we stipulated that the source nodes have a constant
payoff c0 > 0. One could allow the source nodes to have arbitrary positive
utility for different products. This would not affect the proofs. Indeed, in Nash
equilibria the source nodes would select only the products with the highest
payoff, so the other products in their product sets could be disregarded. Further,
the FBRP, the FIP, the uniform FIP and weak acyclicity of a social network
game is obviously not affected by such a modification.
We could also allow the weights to be parametrized by a product. The
corresponding expression in the definition of the payoff function would then
become
∑
j∈N t
i
(s) wji(t) − θ(i, t). In contrast, as shown in Example 25, such a
modification can affect some of the positive results.
Further, the results of this paper can be slightly generalized by using a more
general notion of a threshold that would also depend on the set of neighbours
who adopted a given product. In this more general setup for i ∈ V , t ∈ P (i)
and X ⊆ N(i), the threshold function θ yields a value θ(i, t,X) ∈ (0, 1].
For the results to continue to hold one needs to assume that the thresh-
old function satisfies the following monotonicity condition: if X1 ⊆ X2 then
θ(i, t,X1) ≥ θ(i, t,X2). Intuitively, agent i’s resistance to adopt a product de-
creases when the set of its neighbours who adopted it increases. We decided not
to use this definition for the sake of readability.
This work can be pursued in a couple of natural directions. One is the
study of social networks with other classes of underlying graphs. Another is an
investigation of the complexity results for other classes of social networks, in
particular for the equitable ones, i.e., networks in which the weight functions
are defined as wji = 1|N(i)| for nodes i and j ∈ N(i). One could also consider
other equilibrium concepts like strict Nash equilibria.
Currently we started a study of slightly different games, in which the players
are obliged to choose a product, i.e., games in which the strategy t0 is absent.
Such games naturally correspond to situations in which the agents always choose
a product, for instance a subscription for their mobile telephone. These games
substantially differ from the ones considered here. For example, Nash equilibria
do not need to exist when the underlying graph is a simple cycle.
Finally, we initiated in [3] an analysis of the consequences of introducing
new products in a social network. This can be done using the framework of the
social network games by focusing on the finite best response property and the
finite improvement property. In particular we found that in some cases such a
product addition can lead to a different product selection in which, remarkably,
each agent is strictly worse off.
40
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank the referee for an exceptionally detailed and useful
report. Theorem 5 was suggested by Bernhard von Stengel.
References
[1] N. Alon, M. Feldman, A. D. Procaccia, and M. Tennenholtz. A note on com-
petitive diffusion through social networks. Inf. Process. Lett., 110(6):221–
225, 2010.
[2] K. R. Apt and E. Markakis. Diffusion in social networks with competing
products. In Proc. 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT11), volume 6982 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 212–223. Springer, 2011.
[3] K. R. Apt, E. Markakis, and S. Simon. Paradoxes in social networks with
multiple products. Manuscript, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2013.
Computing Research Repository (CoRR), http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.
7592.
[4] K. R. Apt and S. Simon. A classification of weakly acyclic games. In Proc.
5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT12), vol-
ume 7615 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1–12. Springer, 2012.
[5] A. Borodin, Y. Filmus, and J. Oren. Threshold models for competitive in-
fluence in social networks. In Proc. 6th International Workshop on Internet
and Network Economics (WINE 2010), pages 539–550, 2010.
[6] M. Brautbar and M. Kearns. A clustering coefficient network formation
game. In Proc. 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT11), volume 6982 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 224–
235. Springer, 2011.
[7] N. Chen. On the approximability of influence in social networks. SIAM J.
Discrete Math., 23(3):1400–1415, 2009.
[8] D. Easley and J. Kleinberg. Networks, Crowds, and Markets. Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
[9] M. Granovetter. Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal
of Sociology, 83(6):1420–1443, 1978.
[10] J. Howson. Equilibria of polymatrix games. Management Science,
18(5):312–318, 1972.
[11] N. Immorlica, J. M. Kleinberg, M. Mahdian, and T. Wexler. The role of
compatibility in the diffusion of technologies through social networks. In
J. K. MacKie-Mason, D. C. Parkes, and P. Resnick, editors, ACM Confer-
ence on Electronic Commerce, pages 75–83. ACM, 2007.
41
[12] E. Janovskaya. Equilibrium points in polymatrix games. Litovskii Matem-
aticheskii Sbornik, 8:381–384, 1968.
[13] M. Kearns, M. Littman, and S. Singh. Graphical models for game theory. In
Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
(UAI ’01), pages 253–260. Morgan Kaufmann, 2001.
[14] D. Kempe, J. M. Kleinberg, and É. Tardos. Maximizing the spread of influ-
ence through a social network. In L. Getoor, T. E. Senator, P. Domingos,
and C. Faloutsos, editors, KDD, pages 137–146. ACM, 2003.
[15] I. Milchtaich. Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions.
Games and Economic Behaviour, 13:111–124, 1996.
[16] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic
Behaviour, 14:124–143, 1996.
[17] S. Morris. Contagion. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(1):57–78, 2000.
[18] T. Schelling. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Norton, 1978.
[19] S. Simon and K. R. Apt. Choosing products in social networks. In Proc. 8th
International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), vol-
ume 7695 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 100–113. Springer,
2012.
[20] É. Tardos and T. Wexler. Network formation games and the potential
function method. In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, and V. J.
Vazirani, editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 19, pages 487–516.
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[21] H. P. Young. The evolution of conventions. Econometrica, 61(1):57–84,
1993.
42
